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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




TRUSTEES, INC., and 
JEAN C. CRANMER, 
THOMAS D. BRADEN 





STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The fundamental facts of this case may be simply 
and briefly summarized as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff-Appellant, Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, was organized _.Julr__~, 18~_71 at a time when 
there was no statutory provision relating to the making 
of charitable contributions and under articles which made 
no reference to the making of such contributions. 
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2. The Appellant corporation was formed, as epito-
mized in Appellant's Brief (Appl. Br. 3), "for the pur-
pose of operating and maintaining a railroad'' and ''the 
business of the corporation is the transportation of 
freight and passengers by rail and activities incident 
thereto.'' 
r. _,.. 3. On May 13, 1955, Appellant incorporated under 
I the laws of the St.ate of Utah the Union Pacific Railroad Foundation, as a charitable foundation . 
.______ 
4. On May 26, 1955, Appellant's Directors adopted 
a resolution authorizing a contribution of $5,000.00 to 
the Union Pacific Railroad Foundation, which for pur-
poses of this proceeding, and the prevailing circum-
stances, may be_eonceded to be a charitable donation. 
5. Defendants-Respondents challenged the authority 
of Appellant's Directors to use corporate funds in the 
making of such a donation, and Appellant brought this ~"' ·~ suit for a Declaratory Judgment as to said Director's .,~ ~ower to use=&irpora te funds in the m~king of such a 
~donation. T~-~ trial court upheld Respo~dents '_challenge 
_,. --/ and found on all ISSues Ill favor of Respondents and 
. --r-
against Appellant. 
Respondents contend that the foregoing summary of 
facts constitutes all of the salient points involved in this 
controversy and maintain that Appellant's so-called 
"Statement of the Case'' (Appl. Br. 3-12) insofar as it 
contains any material not included in the above summary 
is argumentative surplusage and subject to the eviden-
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tiary objections of immateriality and irrelevancy. Objec-
tions to this effect were made at the time such additional 
material contained in Appellant's ''Statement of the 
Case" was offered in evidence (R. 51). 
The issue involved in this case is whether it is within 
the powers of the Appellant corporation to make the 
contribution involved in this case or similar contribu-
tions, and not whether this contribution of the Appellant 
corporation was intended to serve or would tend to serve 
the admittedly laudable objectives of charitable giving. 
Accordingly, Respondents are willing to concede that the 
~!_eemo-;~~'i:y.'action taken by the Directors of the Appel-
lant would have been worthy of commendation had they 
been donating their own funds rather than the corporate 
income or assets. If the owners of the corporation, its 
stockholders, had agreed in their articles to permit such 
contributions or did now agree by amending such articles 
or ratifying such acts, there would be no dispute. But 
such is not the case. Respo~~e_nJ;~,-~s some of the owners 
of Appellant corporation, contest the right and authority 
of Appellant's Directors to make such contributions upon 
the ground that they cannot be justified on legal prin-
ciples, notwithstanding the merits of charity and the na-
tional importance of education. To permit said Directors 
to make such contribution and similar contributions is to 
disregard the contract between the Appellant corporation 
and its stockholder-owners. 
Respondents contend that all of the evidence intro-
duced by way of platitudes as to the public service aspects 
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of giving have nothing to do with legal issues involved in 
this matter, which issues relate to the purposes of Appel-
lant corporation. Respondents further contend that all of 
said evidentiary matter could more properly be presented 
at a meeting g_f_the owners of-Appellan:r ·corporation to 
persuade them to amend the articles of contract so as to 
permiT the_ subject contribu_t~~~-!? be made Without ~he 
contest on constitutional and other grounds of the right 
of the Directors to ~se il1~~~e- ~nd assets of the Appel-
lant corporation for donations to good causes. Can it be 
doubted that the stockholders, if so perusaded, would cir-
cumscribe their grant of authority by limitations other 
than the Directors' discretion as what share of the cor-
G''~ porate assets would constitute a '' ~s~~~hare'' "to 
be given, as Appellant asserts, to preserve ''a favorable 
economic and social environment''? 
Respondents submit that to uphold the action of the 
Directors in making such contribution would effectively 
modify the contract between the Appellant corporation 
and the shareholders which originally was formed for the 
purpose of operating and maintaining a railroad, and for 
the transportation of freight and passengers by rail and 
activities incident thereto into a contract including the 
foregoing purposes but adding thereto ''the giving away 
of corporate assets.'' I:g oth~r words the contract whic!t 
originally was to make a profit for the owners woulg_ be 
,--::;:-- changed into a ~Q-P:~~a5}tt~ -m~ke a profit and give to-_chari-
~- tics such part thereof as the Directors specify. I-s it not 
- -~- -~--- -
possible that the stockholders as recipients of dividends 
would prefer to select the objects and be praised for their 
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individual acts of charity made possible by greater 
dividends~ 
Appellant's ''Statement of the Case,'' it is submitted, 
contains a basic non sequitur. Appellant reasons that: 
(1) To make a charitable contribution is good, in fact, 
plausibly needful for society or some elements thereof, 
(2) Appellant's Directors have made a charitable contri-
bution; therefore Appellant's Directors have authority to 
make such charitable contribution. Assuming the major 
premise of the syllogism and conceding the minor prem-
ise, it, nonetheless, does not follow that the action of 
Appellant's Directors in the making of a charitable con-
tribution was within the scope of their legal authority. 
-~\') ((J~_; f:r->IV --_f-t. . -. .~ 1...:: 
Befo!e disc~_ssing the real issues which this case pre~ .;~~~f't~ 
sents, and t_!t-2_~~--~~~~~~~~~.,_.}t-appears·-a-ppro-·::::_ 
priate to comment on certaffi matfers whiC1r may relate 
to the "public interest" involved in the making of 
donations in view of Appellant's emphasis upon "public 
interest. '' 
Appellant's witnesses asserted their faith in and 
their desire to maintain our free enterprise system, a 
faith and desire shared by Respondents. A basic part of ,...-, 
that system is investment ~?r profit. Another basic ele- (!j_) 
ment of that system is the infegrlty of contractual .r-..._). · 
::.; 
r!la~~~mshi ps. 
Much was said by Appellant's witnesses as to the 
importance of education and public welfare in our free 
enterprise system. However, in the field of education, our 
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tax supported public institutions are the very foundation 
of education. Much state and federal tax revenue goes to 
other public welfare functions of government. The rec-
ord in this case amply shows that one of the inducing 
. factors for gifts to the Union Pacific Foundation would 
be that the corporate income so given would not be sub-
ected to taxation. The major portio~ftFedonated 
..._-~ und~u]_~, _except for' donation, have become t~~- ~~v-. 
/ n~~~-the use of which wOUl<I serve the public intere_s~~ 
Mr. John H. Watson, one of Appellant's witnesses, 
stated (Appl. Br. 6 and 40) that corporate gifts now 
aggregate over $500 million annually. A conservative 
estimate would be that such donations result in a reduc-
tion of over a quarter of a billion dollars annually in tax 
revenues from corporations. Had this corporate income 
not been so dona ted and had the funds remaining after 
the payment of corporate taxes been distributed to the 
stockholders as dividends, there would have been still fur-
ther tax revenue. Reduction in tax revenue means either 
reduced funds for education, welfare or other functions 
of government or new or higher taxes to replace the lost 
revenue. New taxes or higher taxes mean that the bur-
den of the gifts is in substantial part imposed upon 
others, including corporation stockholders. 
Appellant is a public utility whose rates are fixed by 
regulation so as to produce a fair return upon its inYest-
ment. Appellant has sought and is seeking rate increases 
to that end. Appellant states (Appl. Br. 50) that the issue 
of whether the contribution in question or similar eontri-
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bu~ay be charged to operating expense with some 
consequent effect upon the users of Appellant's rail serv-
ice is irrelevant. Respondents concede that irrelevancy 
as far as the legal issues in this case are concerned but 
maintain that such circumstance along with other cir-
cumstances are not irrelevant to the portrayal which 
Appellant would make as to the public interest in, and 
fundamental good of, the giving away of corporate 
income. If railroad rates are to be fixed to give a fair re- ) 
turn on the investment, then does it n~ follow that the '/ 
s!_()ckh~l~~r_s _()f App~llant corporati<:>I1,. ~~.<?~ 3:!-~. the_~real 
investors, are entitled to that fair return upon their 
investments. 
Appellant states that a corporation should bear its 
reasonable share of the cost of preserving a favorable 
economic and social environment. The share of corporate a_ 'j 
income which is paid in state and federal taxes represents"--/ 
in and of itself a considerable contribution toward our 
national economic and social environment. 
ARGUMENT 
It will be the purpose of Respondents hereinafter to 
parallel, insofar as feasible, the organization of the Brief 
of Appellant. 
I 
Section 16·-2-14(8) Utah Code .Annotated 
(1953) did not invest Appellant corporation with 
power to make the subject contribution. 
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a. The statutory power to donate is not applicable 
to Appellant, a pre-existing corporation. 
Appellant's discussion under I(a) at pages 13-21 of 
its Brief involves and must necessarily involve the propo-
sition that Section 16-2-14(8) was intended to have and 
does have and could constitutionally have restrospective 
--== ~ 
application to Appellant corporation which was formed 
long prior to such 1955 enactment. 
Appellant points out (Appl. Br. 13) that in addition 
to Utah thirty-eight states, the District of Columbia and 
' _......_,_ .... . . 
~awaii have enacted statutes granting to corporations 
power to engage in philanthropy. Appellant also points 
- ~ o~t that in seventeen of these states the power was grant-
ed without limitation as to amount. It would thus appear 
that the majority of these states passing such enact-
--- .... , .. 
ments have prescribed limitations and have not agreed 
with the ''blank check'' recommendation of the American 
Bar Association committee to which Appellant refers. 
Appellant also contends (Appl. Br. 42-50) that the 
Utah statutory enactment was but a legislative recogni-
tion of an inherent and implied corporate power. If such 
be the case, it is strange that these many states have felt 
legislation to be necessary and if such be the case, then 
it would seem to follow that tlH' twenty-three instances ) ~---~___.. .... "-'"'~· ......... ...,~ . .....).~ ... - - '" -- -.--._..... ' -··'--~·· where the statutes pre.s~~:.i..Q~J@i~!ltions should be said 
· ~ to be e~t~;;rls in~1~e~triction of othe~wi~~--e~i~tin~-~-
\, ~porate power and not ackno:ledgments thereof. 
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The answer to these absurdities IS that no such 
implied corporate power exists. 
Although there are these numerous states where en-
actments have been passed to "legalize the practice" of 
corporate giving, as the American Bar Association com-
mittee report states, Appellant points to only one state, 
New~Jersey, where the power was held to apply retro-
spectively to a pre-existing corporation and in the deci-
sion in that case, which will hereinafter be discussed at 
some length, the court held that under the law of New 
Jersey the !lo'Y~~~ exist~~ ind~p_endently of the statute. 
Completely understandable is the justification for a 
broad and unlimited power to donate when, but only when, 
a statute is given prospective application for under such 
--=-·---._. 
circumstances it lies within the power of the incorpora-
tors and stockholders to prescribe in their articles of 
incorporation those limitations and restrictions which 
they deem to be advisable and proper in their stockholder-
corporation and stockholder inter se contract. 
The language of the Section 16-2-14(8) specifying 
corporate power 
''To make donations for the public welfare or for 
charitable, scientific, religious or educational 
purposes'' 
is wholly lacking in any declaration that it is to be ap-
plied to pre-existing corporations just as its broad lan-
guage is silent and expresses no limitation whatsoever 
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10 per cent or 50 per cent or any other per cent of the 
corporate income or assets. 
Appellant states (Appl. Br. 15) that "every exercise 
of the donative power is subject to the rule of 'reasonable 
business judgment.' '' What is the standard by which 
"business judgment" is to be measured~ If it is to have 
any meaning whatsoever it must mean that any action 
taken by the corporation must have a reasonable and 
reasonably identifiable relation to the furtherance and 
accomplishment of the objects and purposes for which 
the corporation was formed. It has been the application 
of this very standard of ''reasonable business judgment'' 
which has been the basis for the recognition of the rule 
that 
''A gift of its property by a corporation not creat-
ed for charitable purposes is in violation of the 
rights of its stockholders and is ultra vires how-
ever worthy of encouragement or aid the object 
of the gift may be.'' Fletcher Cyclopedia Corpora-
tions Perm. Ed. Section 2939, p. 667. 
If it be said that what Appellant refers to as the "dona-
tive power" has become, as a result of the enactment of 
Section 16-2-14(8), one of the corporate objects and pur-
poses, then wherein would be found the limitation upon 
an enthusiastic sponsoring of that newly added corpo-
rate object of charity and general (not stockholder) wel-
fare 1 If as Appellant contends that statutory enactment 
can convert a busin<.'ss corporation into a partly business 
and party eleemosynary corporation, and if such a con-
version does not constitute a fundamental change in the 
-~:.·· ~ ___ .. _ __...~ 
10 
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corporate objects and purposes as Appellant appears to 
contend, then what could constitute a fundamental change. 
Appellant points out (Appl. Br. 16-18) that Appel-
lant corporation was originally incorporated under the 
Act of January 22, 1897 (L. 1897, Ch. 1, p. 13) and refers 
to an enactment (L. 1901, Ch. 26) revising the Utah stat-
utes as to railroad corporations and to Sections 434 and 
434x of the Compiled Laws of Utah 1907 which have, in 
substance, been carried forward into Sections 56-1-5 and 
56-1-1 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953. In reference to these 
laws Appellant states 
"The foregoing provisions of the Utah railroad 
law, were of course in force in 1945 when the ap-
pellant's corporate life was extended by amend-
ment to its articles of association and they thus 
form a part of the contract between the appellant 
and its stockholders embodied in such articles.'' 
Respondents fully agree with the premise that stat-
utes in force at the time of an extension of corporate exis-
tence become a part of the corporation-stockholder con-
tract at that time. It appears to be Appellant's contention 
that because the Act (L.1907, Ch. 93) declared an express 
legislative intent to give to that particular enactment 
retrospective application and because that specific rail-
road corporation enactment has been carried forward 
into present law, the legislative intent so there expressed 
in 1907 is to be carried over as constituting an expression 
of legislative intent in respect to a 1955 enactment mod-
ifying the general corporation laws. If there could be, 
and Respondents submit that there cannot be, any merit in 
11 
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such a contention then it would appear that Appellant 
must contend that Section 16-2-14(8) should be construed 
as having a retrospective effect in relation to railroad 
corporations because of the provision in the said railroad 
corporation act although there is no justification whatever 
for giving any such a retrospective effect to that section 
as to corporations other than railroad corporations. 
Our Utah Legislature has left no room for doubt as 
to the manner in which statutes are to be construed in 
relation to prospective or retrospective application. Sec-
tion 68-3-3 U.C.A., 1953, definitively and concisely states, 
l __ ''No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.'' 
The same language is found in the Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, Section 88-2-3; and in the Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, Section 88-2-3; and in the Compiled Laws of Utah, 
1917, Section 5840; and in the Compiled Laws of Utah, 
1907, Section 2490; and in the Revised Statutes of Utah 
1898, Section 2490. 
The case of Petersen v. State Tax Commission, 106 
Utah 337, 148 P. 2d 340 (1944) involved a question of 
whether a statute amending a section of the 1943 Utah 
Code Annotated was to be applied retroactively. The 
appellant therein sought, through reference to another 
existing section of the same title of the Code, to attribute 
to the Legislature an intention to give retrospective 
application to the amendment in question - just as in 
the case at bar Appellant seeks to attribute such an inten-
tion to the Legislature by reason of other existing statu-
12 
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tory provisions. This Court rejected the contention and, 
after quoting our Utah Code provision that: 
''No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared'' 
stated {106 Utah 339-341, 148 P. 2d 341-342): 
"That this court is committed to the general 
rule can not be questioned, for in the case of Mer-
cur Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Spry, County 
Collector, 16 Utah 222, 52 P. 382, 384, Judge 
Miner said: 
'Constitutions, as well as statutes, should op-, 
erate prospectively only, unless the words 
"'employed show a clear intention that they 
slioulanave i retroactive effect. This rule of 
.-construction should always be adhered to, 
unless there be something on .the face of the 
statute putting it beyond doubt that tb.e leg1s-
·lature meant it to operate retrospectively, 
Cooley, Const. Lim., p. 73; Suth. St. Const., §§ 
463-465.' 
* * * * * 
"Had the legislature intended Sec. 80-12-7, 
Laws of Utah 1943, to have a retroactive effect, it 
is reasonable to suppose they would have made 
such a declaration in the amendment. The force of 
this is more apparent in view of the holding by this 
court in the case above cited, and by reason of Sec. 
88-2-3, U.C.A. 1943. In view of the decision of this 
court heretofore mentioned and the existence of 
the statute cited above, both of which were in exis-
tence when this enactment was passed by the legis-
lature, and the failure of that body to expressly 
declare in said enactment that it should have a 
retroactive application, can it be said without 
doubt and conjecture what the legislature in-
tended respecting the retroactive effect of the 
amendment in question 1 
13 
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"We are forced to the conclusion that the in-
tention of the legislature is doubtful and that 
Judge Miner's pronouncement of the law, above 
mentioned, is applicable to the situation before us. 
With this in mind and the positive wording of Sec. 
88-2-3, U.C.A. 1943, the general rule of construc-
tion of statutes must apply and we come to the 
conclusion that Sec. 80-12-7, Laws of Utah 1943, is 
not retroactive, but was intended by the legislature 
to be effective on and after the 11th day of May, 
1943, and only those estates whose creators die on 
and after said date are entitled to the deduction 
provided therein.'' 
In McCa.rrey v. Utah State Teachers Retirement 
Board et al, 177 P. 2d 725, 726; 111 Utah 251, 253-254 
( 194 7), this Court stated : 
"Ordinarily legislative enactments are in-
tended to operate prospectively and not retrospec-
tively. As said in 50 Am. Jr. 494, Statutes, Section 
478: 'The question whether a statute operates 
retrospectively, or prospectiYely only, is one of 
legislative intent. In determining such intent, the 
courts have evolved a strict rule of construction 
against a retrospective operation, and indulge in 
the presumption that the legislature intended stat-
utes, or amendments thereof, enacted by it to oper-
ate prospectively only, and not retroactively. 
Indeed, the general rule is that they are to be so 
construed, where they are susceptible of such in-
terpretation and the intention of the legislature 
can be satisfied thereby, where such interpretation 
does not produce results which the legislature may 
be presumed not to haYe intended, and where the 
intention of the legislature to make the statute 
retroactive is not stated in express terms, or 
dearly, explicitly, positiYely, unequivocally, un-
mistakably, and unambiguously shown by neces-
14 
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sary implication or terms which permit no other 
meaning to be annexed to them, preclude all 
question in regard thereto, and leave no reasonable 
doubt thereof. Ordinarily, an intention to give a 
statute a retroactive operation will not be inferred. 
If it is doubtful whether the statute or amendment 
was intended to operate retrospectively, the doubt 
would be resolved against such operation. * * *' '' 
Appellant's argument as to the applicability of the 
1955 enactment to the Union Pacific Railroad Company 
does violence to the rule of construction which this Court 
has announced. 
The very doubts as to the constitutionality of any 
attempt to apply the statute retroactively (which doubts 
were in part the basis of this lawsuit) further argue 
against attributing to the legislature an intention that 
the enactment have retrospective application. 
b. The application to Appellant corporation of the 
statutory power to donate would constitute a 
fundamental change in the shareholders' con-
tract embodied in Appellant's charter. Thus, 
Constitutional objections (U. B. Canst., Art. I, 
Sec. 10, Cl. 1; Utah Canst., Art. I, Sec. 18) 
preclude application of the statute to Appellant, 
a pre-existing corporation. 
The tri-partite nature of the contract embodied in a 
corporate charter ( [1] between state and corporation, 
[2] between corporation and its shareholders, and [3] 
between shareholders inter se) and the historical back-
ground of Section 1 of Article XII of the Utah Constitu-
15 
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tion, relating to the rights thereunder reserved to the 
legislature to alter, amend or repeal laws relating to cor-
porations, were discussed at length .by this Court in 
Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497,91 P. 367 (1907). 
That case is the only case which has decided the 
question of the scope of the reserved power of the legis-
lature under Article XII of the Utah Constitution, al-
though several later Utah cases made reference to such 
reserved power without having to base decision there-
upon. The decision in each such later case was based upon 
the fact that the statute involved was in effect when the 
corporate charter was granted, or extended, and that 
such statute therefore constituted a part of the corpora-
tion -stockholder contract. 
The decision in the Garey case (the thoroughness of 
the consideration of which is amply demonstrated in the 
decision on appeal written by Justice Straup and the 
decision on rehearing written by Justice Frick) clearly 
and directly sets out that the reserved power of the Utah 
legislature "is not without limit" (32 Utah 523, 91 P. 
378) and that the Court's holding "is supported by the 
great weight of authority and is founded upon well estab-
lished legal principles." (32 Utah 523, 91 P. 378.) The 
Utah law in effect in 1897, when St. Joe Mining Co., the 
company involved in the Garey case. was incorporated, 
prohibited amendments in corporate articles to make non-
assessable stock assessable ''without the consent of all 
the stockholders in writing.'' Subsequently, in 1903 (L. 
1903, Oh. 94, p. 80) the Utah Legislature changed that law 
16 
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to permit such an amendment by a vote of "at least two-
thirds of the outstanding capital stock,'' and in 1905 
(L. 1905, Ch. 30, p. 29) the Legislature changed the re-
quired vote to ''a majority of the outstanding stock.'' It 
can hardly be doubted that the Legislature in making 
these changes had concluded that broad public interest 
warranted modification of the Utah corporation laws by 
liberalizing the right of charter amendment. Unfounded 
is Appellant's assertion (Appl. Br. 35) that said statutory 
enactments ''did not purport to be for the benefit of the 
public." It was urged in the Ga.rey case that there was a 
public interest in "having the resources of the state de-
veloped" and "in promulgating wholesome laws" and, 
toward those ends, of permitting assessments in view of 
protection which might thereby be afforded to the cor-
porate enterprise and to stockholders and creditors -
considerations which, among others, doubtless induced the 
legislatures to adopt the liberalizing amendments. How-
ever, in holding that the amendments did not apply to 
pre-existing corporations, the Court, in its decision on 
rehearing, said inter alia: 
"We held that the Legislature, under the reserva-
tion, may alter or amend the contract with refer-
ence to the state and in which it is interested, but 
that it may not make a material or fundameniaf-
cliange ofthe contract whiCh alone concerns the 
c.or~tion and its members.'' (32-- Utah 523, 91 
P. 378) ------------ - -
* * * 
''If any one thing pertinent to the question under 
consideration is well settled by the authorities, it 
is that the power which may be exercised under 
the reservation is not without limit, and that there 
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is a strong tendency in the decisions to limit the 
power of the Legislature to amend the charter 
under the reservation." (32 Utah 523, 91 P. 378) 
* 
"It is of the utmost importance in this connection 
to keep in mind the fact that this limitation is not 
merely to prevent the confiscation of property, or 
to affect or destroy vested rights without due 
process of law (as these matters are controlled by 
other constitutional provisions), but the limitation 
is expressly based upon the narrower ground, 
namely, the im airment of contractual rights and 
obligations." (32 Utah 524, . 79 
.,---·~-
Appellant asserts (Appl. Br. 24) that investing a cor-
poration with power to use corporate income and assets 
"to make donations for the public welfare or for chari-
table, scientific, religious or for educational purposes'' is 
not a fundamental change in the corporate charter. 
Appellant cites no supporting authority for this asser-
tion. It is indeed strange that the Utah Legislature (and 
40 other legislatures) would have passed a special enact-
ment to add that give-away power to the statutory enu-
meration of permissible exercises of corporate power if 
there was not considered to be some basic and funda-
mental alteration through its addition. An analogous 
observation is made in TVeede Y. Emma Copper Co., 58 
Utah 524 at 531, 200 P. 517 at 520 (1921). 
Appellant's argument (Appl. Br. 24-:27) as to the 
right of stockholders to amend articles of incorporation 
so as to add to the corporate purposes or extend the cor-
porate powers is wholly without relevancy since the 
Union Pacific stockholders have not acted to add to 
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Appellant's purposes eleemosynary activity or to extend 
the corporate powers and business to the giving away of 
corporate assets. Appellant's stockholders have not 
amended Appellant's articles to include among its objects 
the formation and financing, with Railroad Company 
funds, of'' a company-established charitable foundation.'' 
Just how fundamentally the objects and purposes of the 
Foundation depart from those of Appellant will stand 
out by comparison of the respective articles. Appellant 
contends that, without stockholder action but with corpo-
rate funds, the financing of the Foundation is within the 
scope of the Union Pacific corporation - stockholder 
contract. 
The question in this case is not what the stockholders 
can do through amendment of the corporation-stock-
holder contract but, rather, whether the Legislature by 
its 1955 enactment, and independent of stockholder action, 
intended to retrospectively alter the corporation-stock-
holder contract, and whether, if any such unexpressed 
intention be imputed to the Legislature, the legislative 
attempt to alter the corporation-stockholder contract 
could be constitutional. 
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 27) Salt L(})ke City Auto-
mobile Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co., et al, 45 Utah 218, 143 
P. 1015 (1914), in support of its contention. That case 
involved the validity of an amendment of the Automobile 
Company's articles of incorporation increasing the capi-
talization and providing for preferred stock. The Court 
pointed out that the section of the Utah corporation law 
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respecting the authority to amend articles of incorpora-
tion was "in force at the time the company was organ-
ized" and that the section of the Utah corporation law 
conferring authority upon corporations to classify their 
capital stock ''was in force when the company was 
organized,'' and stated: 
''It would seem, therefore, that not only is the Leg-
islature by the Constitution authorized to amend 
all laws relating to corporations within the limits 
pointed out by this court in Garey v. St. Joe Min-
ing Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
554, but the right to amend the articles of incorpo-
ration by the majority of the stockholders, with 
the exceptions stated in section 338, supra, is ex-
pressly given. That section is as much a part of 
the articles of incorporation as though it were spe-
cifically referred to or set forth at large therein." 
( 45 Utah 222, 143 P.1016-17) (Emphasis supplied) 
It is clear that in the Salt Lake Automobile Co. case 
there was not involved (as there is in the case at bar and 
as there was in the Garey case) an attempt to give retro-
spective application to a legislative modification of the 
corporation law. It is likewise clear that the Court recog-
nized that any legislative amendment of the corporation 
laws could only be sustained "within the limits pointed 
out by'' this Court in the Garey case. 
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 25, 27) Fower v. Provo 
Bench Carn.al & Irrigat·ion Co., 99 Utah 267, 101 P. 2d 375 
( 1940). Said case has no relevancy to the issues in this 
case. The corporate life of the Irrigation Company in-
volved in that case would have expired in 1937 except for 
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an extension of the corporate life effected through an 
amendment of its articles adopted by its stockholders in 
1937. Referring to these circumstances, the Court said: 
"Hence, the laws in force at the time of the exten-
sion of the corporate life (1937) formed a part of 
the contract between the corporation and its stock-
holders.'' ( 99 Utah 272, 101 P. 2d 377) 
The question involved in the Fower case was the validity 
of certain amendments to the articles of incorporation of 
the Irrigation Company which had been adapted by its 
stockholders after 1937 and which empowered the Irriga-
tion Company to acquire additional water distribution 
facilities, to enter into water acquisition contracts, to en-
cumber its property, to pay its debts, to purchase stock in 
other corporations, to purchase its own stock and to 
assess its stock for corporate purposes. 
The Court pointed out that Section 18-2-44, R.S.U. 
1933 (now Section 16-2-45, U.C.A. 1953, referred to in 
Appellant's Brief page 25) was in effect when the corpo-
rate life was extended as above mentioned, and as to the 
controversial amendments of the articles stated : 
"We hold such amendments to be in conformity 
with Section 18-2-44, R. S.· U. 1933, which reads in 
part: '* * * the adding to the purposes or object 
or extending the powe~ and bus_iness of the corpo-
ration shall not be deemed a change-of the original 
purpose of the corporation * * *' " (99 Utah 274, 
101 P. 2d 378) 
That the case had no application whatever to the 
question of an attempt, such as is involved in the instant 
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case, to give retrospective effect to legislation is clearly 
set forth in the following statement by the Court: 
"The holding hereinabove to the effect that the 
laws in force in 1937 at the time of the extension 
of the corporate life formed a part of the contract 
between the corporation and its stockholders ren-
ders unnecessary a discussion of respondents' con-
tention, and the lower court's conclusion, that the 
amendments to the articles constitute an impair-
ment of contract in violation of Article I, Section 
18, of the Constitution of the state of Utah, and 
of Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the 
United States. No contention is made that legisla-
tion subsequent to 1937 is involved in this con-
troversy." (99 Utah 278, 101 P. 2d 380) 
Novel and unsupported is Appellant's contention 
(Appl. Br. 24) that power to make gifts "could have been 
engrafted on the Appellant's charter by shareholder 
amendment'' and that therefore it could be inserted in the 
charter by "legislative amendment" and without stock-
holder action. 
Appellant's proposition (Appl. Br. 27) is in sub-
stance this : 
(1) Since Appel_lant 's Articles of Association au-
thorized extension of the corporate powers 
through the filing of amended Articles of Asso-
ciation ; and 
(2) Since the Utah statutes (which became a part 
of Appellant's ehartcr in 1945 when its corporate 
existence was extended) contain broad provisions 
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(Section 16-2-45) permitting amendments by ac-
tion of a majority of the stockholders; therefore 
(3) It follows that the Legislature can itself insert 
into Appellant's charter any new powers which 
its stockholders could add through their own and 
voluntary action. 
Said Section 16-2-45 related solely to stockholder 
amendments of articles of incorporation and the fact that / 
the 1905 legislature, in providing an exception to the 1 
requirement of unanimous consent for changes in corpo-
rate purposes, used the rather awkward medium of stat-
ing that certain permitted changes should not be deemed 
changes cannot alter the fact that that section applies 
only to stockholder amendments and that, under any other 
circumstances, including legislative action, a change is a 
change. In each Utah case where an amendment to cor-
porate articles has been upheld under the provisions of 
Section 16-2-45, or its predecessor section, the provisions 
. ~-~··-····-- ---·~·----- ·~ -- ~ -·-- -
--permitting the amendment wer~J~effect when the cor-
-porate charter was granted or extended and were there-
fore a part of the corporation-stockholder contract. The 
addition of the power to donate would represent a change 
and alteration in the corporation-stockholder contract of 
t~ -ir~i~~ -:P;-cifi~--R~ilroad Company. 
In the Garey case this Court held that an amendment 
of corporate articles to provide power to assess corpo-
rate stock could only be made with the unanimous consent 
of the stockholders required under the law in effect when 
the company was incorporated; and that subsequent leg-
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islative action could not obviate the necessity of consent 
by all of the stockholders. Exercise of the power of 
amendment of corporate articles permitted under the 
present Section 16-2-45 requires consent and approval by 
a majority of the stockholders yet App~llaE~ co:nt~~ds that 
the Legislature may not only retrospectively ohviate the 
~ -IJ-ecessity for that coll.~~~t--~~t __ :r:rt.iiY_it_~-~!f _write into the 
articles ·a.n: amendDj_i~t:withont-thQ cgnsent of aJlY gf the 
) "stOckhofdern~------ ----
Appellant's witnesses testified that indirect bene-
fits would accrue to Appellant from philanthropic dona-
tions of corporate funds since such contributions would 
contribute to the preservation of what the Appellant 
refers to as ''a favorable economic and social environ-
ment." In the Ga.rey case, it was claimed that the cor-
poration would benefit through an assessment and that 
its creditors, stockholders and the public would benefit 
from the financial fortification of the corporation. Never-
theless~ this Court declared that the i~~~grity of the cor-
poration-~!~c~~_9ld~contr~cl could not be impaired 
through retrospective application of legislation to a pre-
existing corporation. 
e. The exercise by .Appellant's Directors of the 
asserted power to donate constitutes a riola-
tion and impairment of the corporation-stock-
holder contract, such power not having been 
given in the articles of incorporation or by the 
statutes in effect in 1945 when the life of .Appel-
lant corporation was extended. 
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In its effort to avoid the controlling effect of this 
Court's decision in the Garey case Appellant asserts 
(Appl. Br. 29} that this Court in Cowan et al v. Salt Lake 
Hardware Co., 118 Utah 300, 221 P. 2d 625 (1950), rec-
ognized ''the broad scope of the state's reserved power 
under the Massachusetts rule.'' Respondent';s~brit that 
the Cowan case does not mention the Garey case or indi-
cate any departure from its rule. Neither does the Cowan 
case make any reference to any ''Massachusetts rule.'' 
The Cowa;n case involved an amendment of the 
articles of Salt Lake Hardware Co. whereby non-callable 
preferred stock was made callable. At the time Salt Lake 
Hardware Co. was incorporated the Utah statutes per-
mitted amendment by a vote of ''at least two-thirds of the 
outstanding capital stock.'' Subsequently, but prior to 
the amendment there in question, the statute was modified 
to permit amendment by ''at least a majority of the out-
standing stock." However, the Court pointed out that 
the amendment in question was made "with more than 
two-thirds of its outstanding stock voting in its favor." 
Immediately following the quotation from the Cowan 
case decision set out on pages 29-30 of Appellant's Brief, 
this Court in said decision (quoting from Keetch v. Cord-
ner,' 90 Utah 423, 62 P. 2d 273, 275) reasserted the estab-
lished principle that: 
"The law which was in existence at the time the 
articles of agreement were entered into became a 
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In its quotation from the Cowan case, Appellant gave 
italicized emphasis to the following sentence: 
''However interesting this historical background 
is, it is now well settled that such constitutional 
and statutory provisions authorizing amendments 
of Articles of Incorporation do not only pertain as 
to the relationship between the state and the cor-
poration, but pertain to the rights between the 
corporation and its stockholders." (118 Utah 304, 
221 P. 2d 627) 
But there is nothing in the Cowam case, including the 
last above quoted extract from its decision, which is in 
conflict with the rule of the Garey case wherein this Court 
said: 
''Is it an answer to say that, the reserved power of 
the state being general, therefore it applies to all 
changes of every kina and nature· that may affect 
the powers, rights and privileges of the cOrpora-
tion and of the stockholders with regard to their 
relation with one another? The law no doubt can 
. be changed with regard to all these matters; ·buf 
ir-does-not follow t1Uii_-it _1iw.y be done so as to 
a/Jeer past transactions or vested rights.'.:., (32 
a 527, 91 P. 380)- (Emphasis- supplied) 
This Court in the Cow am case did not and had no 
occasion to include in its statement any reference to retro-
spective application of legislation for the simple reason 
that it was not confronted with any attempt to give 
retrospective application to any statute. 
In support of its contention Appellant cites (Appl. 
Br. 36) Millerv. The State, 15 Wall478 (1873). That case 
involved a special statute which authorized the City of 
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Rochester to invest $300,000 in stock of Genesee Valley 
Railroad Company with provision that the City was to 
appoint one director for each $75,000 so invested. It was 
contemplated that others who had subscribed $977,500 
would elect the remaining nine of the specified thirteen 
directors. Such other subscribers defaulted on their sub-
scriptions to the extent that only $255,200 was subscribed 
by them. The legislature then amended such special stat-
ute to provide for City appointment of one director for 
each $42,855.57 subscribed and paid by the City. 
The United States Supreme Court pointed out in 
the Miller case that the result of the amendment was only 
to carry into effect the purpose of the original legislation 
and that the proportion of City directors and City contri-
bution to total directors and total contribution had not 
been altered by the subject legislation. Said Court fur-
ther stated in the Miller case with respect to the reserved 
power of the legislature that: 
"Such a reservation, it is held, will not warrant 
the legislature in passing laws to change the con-
trol of an institution from one religious sect to 
another, or to divert the fund of the donors to any 
new use inconsistent with the intent and purpose 
of the charter, or to compel subscribers to the 
stock, whose subscription is conditional, to waive 
any of the conditions of their contract." (15 Wall 
498) (Emphasis supplied) 
In support of this statement the said Court cited (among 
other authorities) the Zabriskie case which this Court 
cited in the Garey case. 
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Appellant also cites (Appl. Br. 36) Looker v. MO!!J'Yir 
ard, 179 U.S. 46, 21 S. Ct. 21 (1900). It should be enough 
to say that this Court in the Garey case found nothing 
inconsistent between the rule of the Looker case and its 
own decision in the Garey case, because in the Garey case 
it cited and relied in part upon the Looker case (32 Utah 
510, 91 P. 373). 
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 36) Greenwood v. Freight 
Co., 105 U. S. 13 (1881). That case involved a special 
statute expressly repealing a charter (and therefore re-
lating expressly to the state-corporation contract) which 
had been granted to Marginal Freight Railroad Co. by 
an earlier special statute. At the time such earlier special 
grant of corporate existence had been made the Massa-
chusetts statute expressly provided that: 
" 'Every act of incorporation passed after the 
eleventh day of ~farch, in the year one thousand 
eight hundred and thirty-one, shall be subject to 
amendment, alteration, or repeal, at the pleasure 
of the legislature.' " (105 U. S. 17) 
The United States Supreme Court in the Greenwood case 
said: 
''This expression, 'the pleasure of the legislature,' 
is significant, and is not found in many of the simi-
lar statutes in other States. 
"This statute having been the settled law of 
Massachusetts, and representing her policy on an 
important subject for nearly fifty years before the 
incorporation of the Marginal Compa11y, we cannot 
doubt the authority of the legislature of Massa-
chusetts to repeal that charter. Nor is this serious-
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ly questioned by counsel for appellant; and it may, 
therefore, be assumed that if the repealing clause 
of the act of May 6, 1872, stood alone, its validity 
must be conceded." (105 U. S. 17-18) (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Said Court then discussed at some length the provision 
of said special1872 statute which related to the taking of 
possession of the trackage of the Company whose charter 
had been so repealed upon payment of compensation 
therefor. 
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 36) Polk v. Mutual Re-
serve Fund, 207 U. S. 310, 28 S. Ct. 65 (1907). In that 
case an insurance company, incorporated upon a ''co-
operative or assessment plan," made a reorganization 
under an insurance company act which permitted it to 
write life insurance of every kind. The complainants were 
holders of policies issued prior to such reorganization 
and as such were members of the association. 
In holding that constitutional rights were not vio-
lated in the amendment the United States Supreme Court 
said: 
''The corporation was not changed to a stock, but 
continued as a mutual, company. The change of 
name cannot control the significance of these facts. 
We answer this and the other questions upon the 
assumption, therefore, that the old corporation 
was still in existence, under a new name, and with 
added powers, but with unchanged membership, 
and bound to perform all its existing obligations. 
Upon this view it is impossible to say that any of 
the contract obligations of the association to the 
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complainwnts have been impaired by the reorgarni-
zation." (28 S. Ct. 70) (Emphasis supplied) 
That case dealt with rights and obligations under insur-
ance policies which were not altered by the amendment 
there in question. 
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 36) Stockholders v. Ster-
lilng, 300 U. S. 175, 57 S. Ct. 386 (1937). That case in-
volved an amendment in a banking corporation act 
imposing a liability upon stockholders and directors. The 
act had as a part of the very sentence which imposed the 
liability the specific "condition that this Act and every 
part of it may be altered from time to time, or repealed 
by the legislature." As to the question of whether the 
legislative amendment was unconstitutional the United 
States Supreme Court said: 
"The answer must be 'no,' and this for two rea~ 
sons, first, because the changes are directed to the 
implementing remedies rather than the substan-
tive liability, and, second, because a change of sub-
stantive liability was made permissible by the 
reservation of a power of alteration or repeal." 
(57 S. Ct. 389) 
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 36) Y eix Y. Sixth lf ard 
Assoc., 310 U. S. 32, 60 S. Ct. 792 (1940). That case in-
volved a legislative amendment of an enactment expressly 
relating to withdrawal of shares in a building and loan 
association. The United States Supreme Court said: 
''We are dealing here with financial institutions 
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"With institutions of such importance to its 
economy, the State retains police powers adequate 
to authorize the enactment of statutes regulating 
the withdrawal of shares." (60S. Ct. 794) 
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 37) St. Louis, Iron Moun-
tain& Railwayv. Paul, 173 U.S. 404,19 S. Ct. 419 (1899). 
This is another case involving a specific enactment in 
regulation of a public utility. This case involved an act 
which required (under certain penalties) that a dis-
charged railroad employee be paid, on the day of dis-
charge, unpaid wages then earned. Mere statement of 
the case should show its inapplicability. The United 
States Supreme Court said: 
''This act was purely prospective in its 
operation. '' 
* * * 
''In this case the act was passed 'for the protec-
tion of servants and employees of railroads,' and 
was upheld as an amendment of railroad charters, 
such exercise of the power reserved being justi-
fie~ on public considerations, and a duty was spe- ' 
cially imposed, for the failure to discharge which 
the penalty was inflicted. " ( 19 S. Ct. 421) 
Erie RR Co. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685, 34 S. Ct. 761 
(1914), (Appl. Br. 37) is another case involving railroad 
regulation in which the Court upheld a statute which re-
quired semi-monthly payment of railroad employees. In 
this case the Court said, "Plaintiff now pays monthly. 
The extent of its grievance, therefore, is two payments a 
month instead of one.'' The Court concluded that consid-
erations of public interest permitted the state, in the exer-
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cise of its police and reserve powers, to impose this rail-
way labor regulation. 
In Sutton v. New Jersey, 244 U.S. 258, 37 S. Ct. 508 
(1917), which Appellant cites in its Brief at page 37, 
the question presented was the validity of a statute re-
quiring street railway companies to grant free transpor-
tation to police officers while engaged in the performance 
of their public duties. The Court held that the act was 
not ''an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police 
power'' and concluded its opinion with the following 
statement: 
"The statute is broad in scope, extending also to 
all 'uniformed public officers;' but the court below 
expressly confined its decision to the case pre-
sented, sustaining the law 'in so far as it applies 
to police officers ; ' and our decision is likewise so 
limited." (37 S. Ct. 508) 
How can that case dealing with an express obligation im-
posed "upon street-using corporations" have relevancy 
to the issues in the case at bar? 
Also relied upon by Appellant (Appl. Br. 37) is 
Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 
54 S. Ct. 231 (1934). That case involved the constitution-
ality of the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law which 
was "temporary in operation'' and "limited to the exi-
gency which called it forth." The statute applied to 
natural persons as well as to corporations and in no way 
involved state reserved powers in reference to amend-
ment of corporation laws. The decision relates to state 
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retention or "reservation of essential elements of sover-
eignty" under which the state possesses "authority to 
safeguard the vital interests of its people.'' In upholding 
the legislation the Court said : 
''An emergency existed in Minnesota which fur-
nished a proper occasion for the exercise of the re-
served power of the state to protect the vital inter-
ests of the community.'' 
The Court expressly recognized the existence of an emer-
gency as the foundation for the legislation and said: 
"It is always open to judicial inquiry whether the 
exigency still exists upon which the continued op-
eration of the law depends. " (54 S. Ct. 244) 
It is of interest to note the extent to which the cases 
upon which Appellant relies relate to the continued exis-
tence or regulation of corporations dealing directly with 
the public interest. Said cases have reference to public 
utility franchises or to state regulation of insurance, 
banking or other financial institutions where there was a 
direct and clear interest in the protection of the public 
through the enfranchisement, disenfranchisement or reg-
ulatory aspects of the legislation. 
Throughout Appellant's Brief repeated reference is 
made to A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 13 
N.J. 145, 98 A. 2d 581 (1953). That repeated reference is 
understandable for the Smith case represents a departure 
from established law and such a departure is necessary to 
the sustaining of Appellant's contentions. That the Smith 
case did represent a departure from established law in 
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general, and from established New Jersey law in particu-
lar, is clear from the decision of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court wherein it is said that "the later cases in New Jer-
sey have not disavowed the doctrine of the Zabriskie 
case.'' In brushing aside the New Jersey Court's decision 
in the Zabriskie case, the New Jersey Court in the Smith 
case said: 
"Unfortunately, the court did not consider wheth-
er it was not contrary to the public interest to per-
mit the single minority stockholder before it to 
restrain the railroad's normal corporate growth 
and development as authorized by the Legislature 
and approved, reasonably and in good faith, by 
the corporation's managing directors and major-
ity stockholders." (98 A. 2d 588) 
This Court in the Garey case discussed the express 
question of ''whether the legislature had the authority 
to confer such a power (of amending articles to make non-
assessable stock assessable) upon any number of stock-
holders less th(}Jn the whole," and held that the Utah Leg-
islature did not have such power as to "corporations 
existing when the law was passed." (32 Utah 505, 91 
P. 371) 
One of the fundamental principles of law is protec-
tion of an individual and of a minority against action by 
a majority. Constitutions are written to circumscribe 
what a legislature may do. 
The case at bar involves no principle of sovereign 
exercise of power to prohibit acts or to impose obligations 
in the public interest. It involves the question of whether 
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the Legislature may enact legislation which will permit a 
corporation as one party to an existing corporation-stock-
holder contract, at its election and not by imposed require-
ments, to disregard the contractual rights of the other 
party, the stockholders. If vital public interest were in-
volved, there would be no more justification for permit-
ting 51 per cent of the stockholders, or a majority of the 
directors, to defeat that public purpose than there would 
be for permitting one per cent of the stockholders or one 
director from defeating public purposes. The answer is 
that the Utah Legislature did not require anything. All 
it did (assuming that, contrary to established construc-
tion principles, we impute to the Legislature an intention 
of retrospective application) was to attempt to permit 
corporate exercise of a power not permitted under the 
corporation-stockholder contract - a power to give away 
corporate assets. 
d. The asserted statutory power to donate oper-
ates as a deprivation of the shareholders' prop-
erty without due process of law. (U. S. Canst., 
14th Amend., Sec.1; Utah Canst., Art. I, Sec. 7.) 
In support of its contention that the giving away by 
Appellant's Directors of corporate income and assets -
under circumstances where neither the corporate charter 
nor the laws in effect in 1945 when Appellant's corporate 
life was extended authorized the donation- did not oper-
ate as deprivation of stockholders' property without due 
process of law, Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 41) A. P. 
Smith Ma;n,ufacturing Co. v. Ba,rlow, 26 N. J. Super. 106, 
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referred to and which will be hereinafter more fully dis-
cussed), the New Jersey Superior Court baldly asserted: 
''Nor does the legislation in question offend the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion.'' (97 A. 2d 194) 
citing for its assertion only the cases discussed in the pre-
ceding section of this Brief and Marcus Brown Holding 
Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 S. Ct. 465 (1921). The 
Marcus Brown case, like the other cited cases, not only 
fails to support the proposition for which cited but is 
wholly irrele-vant. 
In the Marcus Brown case the United States Supreme 
Court upheld an emergency enactment prohibiting for a 
specified time the dispossession of tenants. The decision 
in the Marcus Brown case is brief and Respondents urge 
that this Court read that decision in order to observe 
how completely it fails to give any support to the consti-
tutionality of retrospective application of the 1955 Utah 
enactment which is involved in the instant case. 
Any reference in this Brief to retrospective appli-
cation of the 1955 donation enactment should not be read 
as indicating that Respondents concede that such enact-
ment has or was intended to have retrospective applica-
tion. The enactment makes no provision for retro-
spective application and a. construction of its general 
terms as imputing such an intent to the Legislature vio-
lates not only the express rule of statutory construction 
written by the Legislature into our Utah Code (Section 
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68-3-3 U.C.A., 1953) but also long established common law 
rules of statutory construction as hereinabove point-
ed out. 
To the extent that Appellant's corporate income and 
assets are given away by the Directors, the corporate 
assets, which constitute the basic value of the stock, the 
property right of Appellant's stockholders, are reduced 
and funds available for corporate capital or dividend dis-
tribution are decreased. 
The interest of the stockholder-owners of a corpora-
tion in the underlying assets of the corporation was de-
scribed in the Garey case as follows : 
''Every stockholder has a vested equity in and to 
the assets of the corporation.'' ( 32 Utah 520, 91 
P. 377) 
This same fundamental concept was expressed in 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 3 A.L.R. 413, 
434 (1919) by the Michigan Supreme Court as follows: 
''The capital stock of a corporation is always rep-
resentative of the net assets of the corporation, 
whatever they may be, * * *, because it is repre-
sentative of an aliquot part of the net assets of 
the corporation." (3 A.L.R. 434) 
A reduction and decrease of corporate assets through 
gifts is not authorized under Appellant's corporation-
stockholder contract. Appellant's stockholders have never 
acted nor have they ever been consulted as to the dona-
tion power alteration of the corporation-stockholder con-
tract to which they are party. Such procedure is wholly 
wanting in any respect of due process. 
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II 
The contribution to the Union Pacific Foundation 
does not represent a valid exercise by Appelloot of 
an implied corporate power. 
"In Zion's Savings Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Tropic & East 
Fork Irr. Co. this Court held that Article XII, Sec-
tion 10 of the Utah Constitution, which provides 
that 'No corporation shall engage in any business 
other than that expressly authorized in its char-
ter or articles of incorporation,' requires that a 
strict interpretation be given to the Articles of In-
corporation.'' 
Respondents fully concur in this foregoing statement 
made by Appellant on page 42 of its Brief. As recently 
as 1953 this Court in Summit Ra;nge & Livestock Co. v. 
Rees, 1 U. 2d 195, 198, 265 P. 2d 381, 383, reaffirmed "the 
general rule that the corporate powers as outlined in the 
charter are subject to strict interpretation'' citing the 
Zion's Savings Bank case. 
This Court has, of course, recognized that corpora-
tions have such- impliea powers, -buf only such implied 
powers, as are incidental to -,'the-accol?p~ishi~{llie 
general pnrposcs.-2f the corporation as expressed in the 
object clause of its articles." Since the Utah Constitution 
requires that ''strict interpretation'' be given the powers 
and objects expressly set out in the articles of incorpora-
tion, it can hardly be rationally urged that implied powers 
enlarge expressed powers. So-called implied powers are, 
and of necessity must be, but recognition that expressed 
powers are usually general in their terms and embrace 
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the detailed powers necessary for the effectuation of the 
expressed powers. 
The instant case presents the question of whether 
or not it is necessary to the accomplishment of the objects 
expressed in the articles of incorporation of Appellant 
corporation that Appellant have power to give away cor-
porate income and assets in order to promote the general 
welfare by creating what Appellant refers to as a "favor-
able social and economic environment.'' There exists a 
trust relationship between a corporation and its stock-
holders defined by the corporation-stockholder contract. 
Respondents submit that among the most favorable and 
important elements of the social and economic environ-
ment which have made this nation grow and prosper in 
strength and the well-being of its citizens are those con-
stitutional safeguards which were erected to preserve the 
integrity of contracts and the protection of property and 
property rights. The ultimate objective of our corporate 
system is to permit-the aggregation of investments of 
many stockholders to he utilized in a system of production 
and marketing which would not otherwise be possible. 
Appellant in its Brief argues that the power to 
donate corporate funds which the 1955 enactment ex-
pressed was a power which existed and exists as an 
implied power independent of the enactment. In other 
words, Appellant argues that the 1955 enactment added 
nothing to the corporate powers other than to protect 
directors from ''giving or engaging in donative activities 
at the risk of expensive litigation" (Appl. Br. 49). 
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Wherein resides the risk of litigation, if, as Appellant 
asserts (Appl. Br. 48), a corporate donation "represents 
a valid exercise of a judicially well recognized implied 
corporate power.'' 
In this connection it will be observed that Appellant 
asserts (Appl. Br. 13) that thirty-eight states (in addi-
tion to Utah) and the District of Columbia and the Ter-
ritory of Hawaii have enacted legislation intended to per-
mit corporate donations. If, as Appellant contends, the 
fundamental common law as to the scope of implied cor-
porate powers permitted such action, Respondents again 
ask why forty-one legislative bodies have enacted such 
legislation. 
Appellant in its Brief at page 43 states: 
''One of the prime duties of the board of directors 
of any corporation is, of course, to preserve, main-
tain, and, to the extent dictated by the require-
ments of the business, add to the corporate busi-
ness property. It is no less the duty of any board 
of directors to preserve the existence of the cor-
poration itself." 
With these assertions Respondents agree. However, in 
the Garey case it was argued that corporate assessments 
might be needed to preserve the existence of the corpora-
tion, and as to this contention this Court said: 
"But that is something which the corporators 
should consider when they make their contracts. 
~ Courts are organized to enforce contracts as made, ~ unless they contravene good morals or public pol-' icy." (32 Utah 521, 91 P. 377) 
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In its Brief on pages 45 and 46 Appellant cites a 
group of cases which have reference to pension, relief, 
hospital, medical, health and disability funds which cor-
porations had created for the benefit of their employees. 
The clear relationship of these matters to the employer-
employee relations and direct corporate interest can 
hardly be more patently illustrated than by the fact that 
such matters are an inherent part of labor contracts in 
many industries. It is one thing to recognize the direct 
interest of a corporation in its labor relations and a 
completely different thing to assert that the corporation 
has implied power to provide pension, relief, hospital, 
medical, health and disability funds for the benefit of 
those who have no relation to the corporation other than 
as being a part of the general public. (See Note, 3 
A.L.R. 443) 
Appellant, for some inexplicable reason, cites Hutton 
v. West Cork Railway Co., 23 Ch. D. 654, at page 44 of its 
Brief. The Hutton case involved an attempted donation 
of corporate funds, derived from a sale of the Company's 
undertaking, to officials of the Company who as a result 
of the sale lost employment and to directors for past serv-
ices rendered when there was no agreement that they 
should be compensated. Even after the donation resolu-
tion had been approved by a "large majority" of the 
stockholders, the English court enjoined the making of 
the donations. While the dictum of that case inferred 
that corporate funds might be expended for other than 
strictly legal obligations ''as an inducement to (em-
ployees) to exert themselves in the future, or as an act 
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done reasonably for the purpose of getting the greatest 
profit in the business of the company" (page 666), the 
English court said '~~~-~rity has no .. pla,~e __ to si~ at boards 
of directors" (page 673). It is difficult to conceive of 
Appellanffinding any comfort in the Hutton case. 
Appellant also cites (Appl. Br. 46) Armstrong Cork 
Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co. 285 Fed. 58 (1922), in support 
of its position. This case is a decision of a federal dis-
trict court. The case involved donations, by ''a so-called 
family corporation" whose capital stock "was owned by 
a few persons, all relatives,'' to colleges near the Com-
pany's place of business, made with contemplation that 
those colleges would engage competent teachers and in-
struct students in business and industrial affairs, there 
being no collegiate institution in the vicinity which pre-
sented such opportunity for education. In applying the 
rule of permitting acts ''done for the purpose of serving 
corporate ends,'' the court said: 
''I think the advantage derived was tantamount 
to a personal benefit .... 
''This rule, it is thought, may be fittingly applied, 
especially as neither stockholder nor creditor chalr-
lenges the right exercised by the officers to make 
the contributions." (285 Fed. 59) (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Throughout Appellant's Brief reference is made, as 
above mentioned, to the case of A. P. Smith Manufac-
turing Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145;"9n. 2.d 581, 39 A.L.R. 
2a 1179 (1953), wherein the New Jersey Supreme Court 
upheld a $1,500 donation made by the Smith Company to 
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Princeton University. The case involved a New Jersey 
statute enacted in 1953 which authorized every New J er-
sey corporation "unless otherwise provided in its cer-
tificate of incorporation or other certificate filed pursuant 
to law or its by-laws'' to make donations for philan-
thropic, educational and other specified purposes. The 
New Jersey statute prescribed certain definite limita-
tions upon the amount which could be given without stock-
holder approval. 
Two important distinctions are apparent between 
that New Jersey legislation and the 1955 Utah donation 
statute: First, there was in the New Jersey statute lan-
guage from which there could be attributed to the New 
Jersey legislature an intention of retrospective applica-
tion while the Utah statute contains no such language. 
Second, the permissive donation power under the New 
Jersey statute was circumscribed by limitations for the 
protection of the stockholders while the Utah statute pur-
ports to grant an unrestricted donation power. 
Respondents concede that the broad language of the 
Smith case appears to justify and support in some meas-
ure Appellant's contentions as to the validity of the Utah 
enactment. In fact, this proceeding and the nature of the 
proceeding and the evidence introduced herein reflect an 
effort to present parallelism with the Smith case. 
In reading the New Jersey Courts' philosophical dis-
courses, sight must not be lost, however, of the fact that 
the New Jersey Courts were cognizant of and gave ex-
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press recognition to the :Q_rotective limitations which the 
New Jersey enactment prescribed. 
The New Jersey Superior Court in its decision ( re-
ferred to by the New Jersey Supreme Court as "well 
reasoned") stated: 
"Limitations are however imposed upon this 
granted power of contribution.'' (97 A. 2d 188) 
"It cannot be earnestly suggested that the limited 
contribution allowed by the statutes in question 
'defeats or substantially impairs' the object of 
the grant of corporate power to Plaintiff. Even if 
it were assumed that the diversion of a corporate 
sum within the limits of the statutes does in some 
mathematical measure impair the rights of stock-
holders, it is not a substantial impairment." (97 
A. 2d 194) (Emphasis supplied except that the 
word ''substantial'' was italicized in the opinion.) 
The emphasis which Appellant places upon the Smith 
case is readily understandable for the case represents a 
striking and startling departure from well established 
legal principles. Abrupt departure from established law 
and disregard of the rule of construction prescribed in 
Section 68-3-3, U.C.A. 1953, is necessary to an upholding 
of retrospective application of a statute permitting cor-
porate directors to give away corporate assets without 
authority in the charter or the statutes in existence at the 
time of creation or extension of the corporate existence. 
An example of one of the high-sounding platitudes of 
the New Jersey Superior Court will be found in its 
assertion that : 
''What promotes the general good will inescapably 
advance the corporate weal." (97 A. 2d 190) 
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The vice which inheres in such reasoning upon which the 
Smith case is grounded can be shown by a simple analogy : 
The State of Utah needs a new building for offices of State 
branches of government. A gift of an office building to 
the State would no doubt promote the general good, but 
would the gift of such a building by its corporate owner 
advance that corporation's good wilU The New Jersey 
Superior Court's concept of corporate weal is illustrated 
in the second sentence following the above quotation 
where the New Jersey Court says, ''The benefits derived 
from such contributions are nation-wide and promote the 
welfare of everyone anywhere in the land.'' No doubt the 
benefits derived from tax impositions are nation-wide and 
promote the welfare of everyone anywhere in the land, 
but does it follow that corporation directors should pay 
undue taxes, and would it be said of such overpayments 
that because the increased government revenue promotes 
the general good will, the corporate weal is thereby ines-
capably advanced 1 How long could the corporation 
endure if directors operated its corporate business on 
the premise that whatever promotes the general good 
inescapably advances the corporate weaH The platitude I 
could convert any corporation for profit into a non-profit 
corporation. If giving a little promotes the general good 
and advances the corporate weal, the greater the giving 
the greater the corporate weal. 
That the New Jersey Supreme Court was aware of 
the departure of its decision from established law is indi-
cated by its statement that: 
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"The genius of our common law has been its ca-
pacity for growth and its adaptability to the needs 
of the times. Generally courts have accomplished 
the desired result indirectly through the molding 
of old forms. Occasionally they have done it di-
rectly through frank rejection of the old and recog-
nition of the new." (98 A. 2d 581, 586, 39 A.L.R. 
2d 1179 at 1188) 
That the New Jersey Court did what it did through 
the rejection of the old and the creation of the new stands 
out in an analysis of its decision and the cases therein 
referred to. However, the decision lacked complete frank-
ness because cases were cited for propositions which they 
do not support, as shown by the hereinabove discussion 
of those cases. 
That the New Jersey Court has chosen to declare 
that the integrity of contracts and the protection of con-
stitutional rights were subservient to -public approval of 
tlie diversion of corporate funds to charity does not re-
quire that this Court adopt a like philosophy. This !J_?urt 
-has unequivocally spoken in respect to the law oLtbj.s_ 
State as to retrospective application of amendments of 
our Utah corporation statutes. 
Respondents say, as did Lord Justice Bowen in the 
Hutton case : 
"As soon as a question is raised by a dissentient 
shareholder, or by a person standing in the posi-
tion of a dissentient shareholder, sympathy must 
be cut adrift, and we have simply to consider what 
the law is.'' 
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If the law is that corporations can, without regard 
to their charters and the laws which became a part of 
them and without action of the stockholders, make con-
tributions from corporate assets merely because the 
benefits derived from such contribution are nation-wide 
and promote the welfare of everyone anywhere in the 
land, then that law must be found in the Smith case for 
nowhere elselri-the niany caseson the subject has its exis-
- tence been recognized. T-o-the-cuntrary;- it has been re-
peatedly ·:re-cognizeat1i~(-~~el'e_fi!!!~.Lb~ __ f?Q~~j_g_(:l!l~le 
direct or indirect benefit to the corporation. 
,.........__ ~··---
The Smith case decision gave much emphasis to the 
importance of private institutions of learning. Despite the 
broad dicta of the case, what the decision in that case 
upheld was a donation of $1,500 made by the Smith Com-
pany to Princeton University. As to that donation the 
New Jersey Supreme Court said: 
"It was made to a pre-eminent institution of 
higher learning, was modest in amount and well 
within the limitations imposed by the statutory 
enactments, and was voluntarily made in the rea-
sonable belief that it would aid the public welfare 
and advance the interests of the plaintiff as a pri-
vate corporation and as part of the community in 
which it operates." (98 A. 2d 581, 39 A.L.R. 2d 
1179, 1191--2) 
What the New Jersey Court did was to affirm a de-
cision which held that a particular gift by a particular 
company to a particular university of the community in 
which the corporation operated was, under the New J er-
sey law, within the implied powers of that company. 
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There was presented to the United States Supreme Court 
upon the appeal (which appeal was dismissed for "want 
of a substantial federal question") only what the New 
Jersey Court did, not what it said. 
A state holding as to the law of that state with re-
spect to the implied powers of a corporation of that state 
presents no federal question. Far from upholding the 
New Jersey enactment as granting retrospectively a new 
power, the New Jersey Supreme Court said: -
L'' ... its enactments simply constitute helpful an~···· confirmatory declaration of such (implied corpo-rate) power, accompanied by limiting safe-guards.'' ( 39 A.L.R. 2d 1191) I 
In the case at bar Appellant did not, as in the Smith 
case, make a gift to an institution of higher learning in 
the community in which it operates. Appellant made a 
gift of $5,000 to the company-established Union Pacific 
Foundation. The Foundation, and not Appellant, deter-
mined that, from thus supplied Foundation funds, the 
Foundation would give $4,000 to Brigham Young Univer-
sity. It was within the power of the Foundation to give 
it for any charitable, educational or scientific project 
selected by it. The recipient, had the Foundation so 
chosen, could have been anywhere within or without the 
United States. When the donation was made to the Union 
Pacific Foundation, Appellant had no say as to how or 
where the money would be used. 
It is inescapably clear that the New Jersey Courts 
in the Smith case gave broad interpretation to corporate 
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powers. It is equally inescapably clear that this Court 
in recognition of the provisions of Section 10 of Article 
XII of the Utah Constitution has declared that in Utah 
corporate powers must be given ''strict interpretation.'' 
The New Jersey Court made clear its philosophy ' 
that constitu_ti_onat barxie-~"~-~~;;·-~~niate-r(Lcllfr~nt__. 
concepts of general welfare. Expressive of this new 
philo.sophy is the foll~ng statement of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court : 
''As has been indicated, there is now widespread 
belief throughout the nation that free and vigor-
ous non-governmental institutions of learning are 
vital to our democracy and the system of free en-
terprise and that withdrawal of corporate author-
ity to make such contributions within reasonable 
limits would seriously threaten their continuance. 
Corporations have come to recognize this and 
with their enlightenment have sought in varying 
measures, as has the plaintiff by its contribution, 
to insure and strengthen the society which gives 
them existence and the means of aiding themselves 
and their fellow citizens. Clearly then, the appel-
lants, as individual stockholders whose private 
interests rest entirely upon the well-being of the 
Plaintiff corporation, ought not be permitted to 
close their eyes to present-day realities and thwart 
the long-visioned corporate action in recognizing 
and voluntarily discharging its high obligations as 
a constituent of our modern social structures.'' 
( 39 A.L.R. 2d 1192) 
In sharp contra~ to that new concept is the estab-
lished law as expressed by the Supreme Court of Michi-
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gan in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 3 A.L.R. 
440 (1919), where that court said: 
''The difference between an incidental humani-
tarian expenditure of corporate funds for the 
benefit of the employees, like the building of a hos-
pital for their use and the employment of agencies 
for the betterment of their condition, and a gen-
eral purpose and plan to benefit mankind at the 
expense of others, is obvious. There should be no 
confusion (of which there is evidence) of the 
duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the 
stockholders owe to the general public, and the 
duties which in the law he and his codirectors owa 
to protesting, minority stockholders. A business 
corporation is organizeg_and carrjgq _ _<>_:g, :Qrimaliiy 
!Ortne profit of the stockholders. The powers of 
the mrecfors-are--to be employed- for t~at end. 
The discretion of directors is to be -exercised in 
the choice of means to attain that end, and does 
not extend to a change in the end Itself, tO tlie re:, 
d.uction of profits, or to the nondistribution of 
profits among stockholders in order to devote them 
to other purposes." (3 A.L.R. 440-1) 
In making the choice of following declared law of this 
St-~te which finds support through the decided cases of 
many decades, or the alternative choice of following the 
dictum discourse of the New Jersey Court in discarding 
established law as an old and obsolete form, this Court 
will, no doubt, consider Section 10 of Article XII of the 
Ut~n- Q<?,nst-~ttition·--P~:escrib~g "strict interpretatio~~~ of 
corporate pQ~~r~_and Section 68-3-3 _o!_ou_r_Code prescrib-
ing that ''no part of thes~~-~Yised_st_atuJ~_es i~ retroactive, 
uri1.;-s e;pressly so declared'' - considerations not be-
d-- ------- -·- ------- ·--- ------
fore the N e:'Y~ ersey Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is sub~!ted that the judgment of the District 
Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
10 Exchange Place 
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